Resource purchasing funds have become a major tool for environmental protection and resource conservation. These funds use various strategies to target resources for environmental conservation, the choice of which may lead to striking differences in environmental performance. This paper develops an analytical framework to compare the effects of alternative targeting strategies on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and environmental benefits. We demonstrate that ignoring the output price effect of purchasing funds reduces environmental gain from the purchasing fund and, in some cases, may make a purchasing fund counterproductive. A purchasing strategy that targets resources with the highest environmental benefits may be counterproductive even if the price feedback effect is recognized. This strategy, however, will have the smallest impact on output price and overall resource use among all strategies considered and should be favored by consumers and input providers. A strategy that targets low-cost resources will result in the largest reduction in production and the largest output price increase, and should be favored by resource owners. A strategy that targets resources with the highest benefit-to-cost ratio is efficient and provides the largest environmental benefits for a given budget when the output demand is perfectly elastic. This strategy, however, no longer maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget when output demand is not perfectly elastic, and should not be the most preferred strategy of any group. We argue that the optimal design of targeting criteria must consider the price feedback effect.
environmental value. Benefit targeting acquires resources with the highest per-unit environmental value regardless of the per-unit cost. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service tends to target wetlands and other water resources based primarily on biological criteria. Benefit-cost targeting obtains resources according to the ratio of environmental benefit to economic cost.
There is a growing tendency to employ this criterion in environmental purchasing activities. 2 Choice of a targeting strategy for a conservation fund may be determined by both political and economic considerations. 3 Several interest groups are potentially affected by conservation funds, including resource owners, consumers, and environmentalists. As purchasing funds become more widely used, the question naturally arises as to which targeting scheme will be preferred by affected groups. Should environmentalists prefer benefit targeting? Should resource owners prefer cost targeting? Should consumers prefer benefit-cost targeting?
In this paper, we attempt to address these questions by comparing the effects of alternative targeting strategies on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and environmental benefits. Our framework assumes a heterogeneous resource base where resource units have a joint distribution of fixed coefficients of output and environmental benefit. This assumption was used by Houthaker [12] and Johansen [13] to provide the theoretical foundation for aggregate neoclassical production functions and was expanded by Hochman and Zilberman [11] , Just and Antle [14] , and Opaluch and Segerson [16] to environmental policy analysis. 4 Consistent with these studies, we abstract from information problems and assume that the policymaker has full information about resource productivity and environmental benefits. 5 The increased availability of detailed micro-level data combined with GIS techniques make this approach empirically tractable and it has been applied in recent policy debates. 6 We demonstrate that groups differ in their preference ordering of the conservation strategies.
Producers should prefer cost targeting; consumers, labor and input suppliers should prefer benefit targeting; and environmental groups should prefer benefit-cost targeting when output demand is perfectly elastic. We consider price feedback effects associated with inelastic output demand.
This feedback reduces the effectiveness of the purchasing fund and may change the preference of environmentalists over benefit or benefit-cost targeting. We show that when output demand is Conservation Targeting Strategies / 9 not perfectly elastic benefit-cost targeting no longer maximizes total environmental benefits for a given budget. We obtain conditions under which ignoring the feedback from increased output price leads to an overall decline in environmental quality and argue that optimal design of purchasing strategies should incorporate output market considerations.
The next section discusses alternative targeting strategies for conservation funds. Section 3 compares the economic, environmental, and distributional effects of these strategies for the case of fixed output price. Section 4 considers the "slippage" of environmental benefits associated with the output price increase. Section 5 derives the targeting criterion that maximizes total environmental benefit when output demand is not perfectly elastic. Section 6 compares the performance of all targeting strategies for the case of inelastic output demand. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results.
Targeting Strategies
Consider a competitive industry producing an output using a resource that also generates environmental benefit. The quality of the resource is differentiated by the output and environmental benefit per unit of resource, both of which are assumed to be fixed (the putty-clay assumption). Let y be output per unit of resource, and let b be the environmental benefit per unit of resource if the resource is preserved. Let s(y, b) be the resource distribution function, where y varies from 0 to y and b varies from 0 to b . Production cost per unit of resource is assumed constant and is denoted by c. In many cases the resource is land and y is output unit of land, and b is the environmental benefit provided by one unit of land when it is removed from production.
For example, b may represent biodiversity benefit or reduction in soil erosion.
The difficulty of accurately measuring the social value of environmental benefits creates a formidable obstacle to determining the optimal budget. 7 Governments in many cases set a budget for the purchasing fund and then design a criterion for targeting resources for purchase. In this paper we accommodate this procedure and consider four popular targeting criteria under a given budget. Let i be an index of the targeting criteria, with i = 0 representing the resource situation before the establishment of the conservation fund. Cost targeting (i = 1) purchases the least expensive resources. Benefit targeting (i = 2) purchases the resources with the highest environmental benefit, regardless of cost. Benefit-cost targeting (i = 3) purchases resources with the highest ratio of environmental benefit to economic cost. Benefit-maximizing targeting (i = 4) maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget.
Each targeting strategy corresponds to selecting a subset of (y, b) from the base resource set
The total number of resource units in
The total output Y X ( ) and the total environmental benefit B X ( ) are ()(,) and
Short-term profit or quasi-rent from using the resource is
where p is output price. To compare the economic and environmental impacts of alternative targeting strategies, it is important to identify both the resources in production and resources in conservation under each of these strategies.
Let U i be the set of resources ((y, b) combinations) in production under strategy i. 8 
U U U
where U i ru is the set of reused resources -resources utilized both before and after the introduction of the conservation fund, and U i ac is the set of activated resources -previously idle resources to be used in production after the establishment of the conservation fund because of the resulting output price increase.
Let I i be the set of resources in conservation under strategy i.
where I i rt is the set of retired resources -previously utilized resources purchased by the fund, I i rn is the set of retained resources -previously idle resources purchased by the fund, which would be used in production if not purchased because of the output price increase, and I i lp is the set of low productivity resources -resources in preservation both before and after the introduction of the conservation fund.
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By using these notations and the functions defined by equations (1) through (3), the number of resource units in production under strategy i is Q U i ( ), 9 and the number of resource units in conservation under strategy i is Q I i ( ) . The key performance measures for strategy comparison
iii) total producer surplus from both production and the conservation fund ∆B i < 0 , the conservation fund is said to be counterproductive. In the next section, we compare the performance of the four targeting strategies, assuming output price is fixed.
Comparing Targeting Strategies: Fixed Output Price
When output demand is perfectly elastic, output price is not affected by the purchasing fund for all i). In this case, benefit-cost targeting maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget (i.e., it becomes identical to benefit-maximizing targeting).
Suppose the conservation fund is operated under full information, and resource owners will divert the resource from production if offered the opportunity cost in production. Under cost targeting (i = 1), there is a critical output level y * such that all resources with output lower than y * will be preserved. Thus, the retired resources under this strategy are
where y * is defined by P( ) I G rt 1 = , and G is the total budget of the conservation fund. Reused resources under cost targeting are
Under benefit targeting (i = 2), there is a critical level of environmental benefit b * such that all utilized resources with b b > * will be diverted from production. Thus, retired resources under this strategy are 
where b * is defined by P( ) . I G rt 2
=
Reused resources under benefit targeting are
Under benefit-cost targeting, there is a critical benefit-cost ratio, MB*, such that all utilized resources with b p y c MB ( ) * 0 − > will be preserved. Thus, the retired resources under benefitcost targeting are
where MB* is defined by P( ) .
The reused resources under this strategy are
These three targeting strategies can be illustrated by using Proposition 1: If the conservation fund has no effect on the output price, then
Proof: From Figure 1 , the difference in the number of resource units in conservation under benefit targeting and benefit-cost targeting is
Because resources in K+M are more productive and therefore more expensive than resources in I, a given budget can purchase more resources in I than in K+M. Thus,
Under cost targeting, least expensive resources are purchased first. As a result, more resources will be purchased under cost targeting than under benefit or benefit-cost targeting. This result along with (13) implies the relationships in (i). Because I U R i i + = is fixed, (i) implies (ii).
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To prove Y Y Y 2 3 1 ≥ ≥ , notice that the resources in production under the three targeting strate-
To determine the sign of the difference, note that
By using (2), we obtain 
Substituting I H I J K
Finally, by substituting (20) into (14) and (15), we obtain
To compare profit and producer net returns under these targeting strategies, note that when the output price is fixed resources that are profitable to use are the same under the three targeting
total profit from production under the three targeting strategies are also identical.
To prove B B 
Substitute I H I J K
Under both the cost and benefit-cost targeting strategies, resources in I+J will be targeted for conservation. Thus, the same amount of money is left for purchasing resources in L under benefit-cost targeting and for purchasing resources in H+K under cost targeting. Because cost per unit of benefit is less in L than in H+K, a given budget can purchase more environmental benefits from resource in L than from resources in H+K, implying that the right-hand side of (24) 
The difference between total benefits under cost and benefit targeting cannot be signed. To see why, note that
Although resources in I+H offer less benefit per unit than resources in L+M, resources in I+H are less expensive than resources in L+M. As a result, a given budget can purchase more
The differences in output, environmental benefits and the total amount of resource saved under the three targeting strategies depend on the correlation between productivity and environmental benefits. When they are negatively correlated, resources that cost less are also more likely to offer larger environmental benefits. In this case, all three strategies are likely to target the same resources. For example, the differences in the amount of resources purchased and the total output under benefit and cost targeting are
These differences would be relatively small when productivity and environmental benefits are negatively correlated because there are fewer resource units in both H+I and L+M. Intuitively, a negative correlation between b and y implies that, on average, resources that cost less are also more likely to offer larger benefits. As a result, cost targeting and benefit targeting are more likely to target the same resources (resources in J+K). On the other hand, when costs and benefits are positively correlated, resources that cost less are also more likely to offer fewer benefits. As a result, most resources purchased under cost ranking will be in H+I, whereas most resources purchased under benefit ranking will be in L+M. Because resources in H+I are less expensive than resources in L+M, more resources will be purchased under cost targeting than under benefit targeting. As a result, both differences in (27) are relatively large.
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Output and the amount of resource saved under benefit-cost targeting are between those obtained under cost targeting and benefit targeting. This suggests that total output and resource saved under all three targeting criteria will be quite close when benefits and costs are negatively correlated, and they will be quite different when benefits and costs are positively correlated.
Similarly, it can be shown that the differences in total environmental benefits achieved under the three targeting criteria will be small when productivity and environmental benefits are negatively correlated and large when they are positively correlated.
Proposition 1 suggests that environmentalists should prefer benefit-cost targeting because it results in the largest environmental benefits. Groups that are interested in maintaining higher production levels, such as labor, would prefer benefit targeting over benefit-cost targeting or cost targeting because benefit targeting takes the smallest amount of resource out of production and results in the highest output level. Producers should be indifferent among the three targeting strategies because total producer surplus does not change across the alternatives.
In the next three sections, we analyze the outcomes for the case of downward sloping demand. We first identify conditions under which the targeting strategies may be counterproductive and then compare their economic, environmental, and distributional impacts.
Endogenous Output Price and Slippage
With a downward sloping demand curve, the conservation fund will increase the output price as resources are diverted from production. This increase in output price can cause two types of "slippage". First, it becomes profitable to use some previously idle resources. These resources would be used in production if not purchased, reducing total environmental benefits.
On the other hand, if these resources are purchased, less money is available for purchasing other resources. Second, the increase in output price makes resources more valuable in production. If the resource owners anticipate this price increase, they will ask for higher selling prices. As a result, fewer resources can be purchased with a given budget. To analyze the likelihood of the counterproductive outcome, define the benefit intensity of
X as the ratio of average benefit to average output of resources in X, .
Counterproductive outcomes are likely to occur as the ratio of the benefit inten- We consider two policy designs in response to slippage. One is unrestricted targeting, where targeting is not restricted to resources in production. In this case, some of the previously idle resources that become profitable to use are purchased. The other is restricted targeting, where a purchasing fund is designed to purchase only resources in production. The CRP, for example, targets only cropland currently in production. In this case, some low quality resources that were idle before will be utilized because of the price increase. Thus, six policy scenarios are evaluated below. and are retired and low productivity resources, and U a ru 1 is the reused resources.
Because all previously idle resources are either purchased or still unprofitable to use, there are no = ( ) , which is positive except when output demand is perfectly inelastic. With a perfectly inelastic demand, the environmental gain will disappear, and the conservation fund is fully transferred to owners of low-quality resources.
ii. Restricted Cost Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 2b . In this case, some previ- 
iii. Unrestricted Benefit Targeting: This case is depicted in Figure 3a are activated. The net environmental gain is
As output demand becomes more inelastic, slippage tends to increase. In some cases, the introduction of purchasing fund may be counterproductive from an environmental perspective.
Proposition 2: All restricted targeting criteria and unrestricted benefit targeting may reduce environmental quality. The conditions for the counterproductive outcome are 
Proof: First, we prove (28). By definition,
The difference between (32) and (33) is
Also the budget constraint implies
Divide (34) 
Thus, ∆B 1b ≤ 0 if and only if 
Substituting (37) into (39) gives (28). The proofs of conditions (29) (28) in Figure 2b ) to the activated resources (U b ac 1 ). The RHS of (28) is the ratio of the output of the activated resources to the output of the retired resources. The purchasing fund will reduce environmental quality if the aggregate benefits of activated resources are greater than the aggregate benefits of the retired resources. The retired resources produce more output than the activated resources (output price increases with the purchasing fund). Condition (28) shows that if the purchasing fund has a counterproductive effect, the benefit to output ratio of activated resources must be larger than the benefit to output ratio of retired resources ( i.e.,
To satisfy condition (28), environmental benefits must be negatively correlated with productivity. This happens, for example, when most resources are concentrated along line bc in figure   2b . But the negative correlation between y and b is only a necessary condition since it guarantees the LHS of (28) is less than one. For counterproductive outcome to occur, the output demand has to be sufficiently inelastic so that the RHS of (28) is larger than the LHS of (28).
Unrestricted benefit targeting will result in counterproductive outcome under condition (29).
This condition suggests that the smaller the ratio of the benefit intensity of retired resources ( I a rt 2 in Figure 3a ) to the activated resources (U a ac 2 ), the more likely the counterproductive outcome to occurs. The counterproductive effect will not happen when benefits and productivity are negatively correlated and LHS > 1. The RHS of (29) is the ratio of the output of the activated resources to the output of the retired resources. The counterproductive effect is more likely as the RHS is closer to one, which occurs when the output demand is inelastic (η is small).
With unrestricted benefit targeting, much of the money will be spent to purchase high productivity resources in I a rt 2 in Figure 3a . Significant price increases (for small η ) will activate low productivity resources in U a ac 2 . More resources may be activated than retired (even though activated resources produce less output). If productivity has a much larger variation than envi-20 / Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock ronmental benefits, and environmental benefits are positively correlated with productivity (for example, when most resources are concentrated along line ab in Figure 3a) , then the purchasing fund may be counterproductive.
Restricted benefit targeting will result in a counterproductive environmental outcome under condition (30). This condition is likely to hold when (a) output demand is quite inelastic, (b) environmental benefits and productivity are negatively correlated, and/or (c) the variation in productivity is much larger than the environmental benefits. Under (a), η is very small and the right-hand side of (30) is close to one. Unlike the case of unrestricted benefit targeting, negative correlation between y and b will increase the likelihood of counterproductive effect of restrictive benefit targeting. Under the negative correlation (for example, when resources are concentrated along cb in Figure 3b ), the resource intensity of activated resources is greater than that of the retired sources, and the LHS of (30) is more likely to be less than one. When variation of productivity is large, much of the budget will be spent on purchasing some highly productive resources under benefit targeting. Thus, as output price increases, more resources may be activated than retired. Condition (c) is especially important if the correlation is positive because it makes the LHS of (30) smaller (for example, when resources are concentrated along ab). In this case, when environmental benefits do not vary greatly, the environmental loss from activating low productivity resources may be greater than the gains from preserving previously utilized ones.
Restricted benefit-cost targeting will result in a counterproductive environmental outcome under condition (31). The LHS of (31) is the ratio of the benefit intensity of the retired resources to the benefit intensity of the activated resources. It is likely to be less than one if the correlation between b and y is negative (for example, when most resources are concentrated along cd in figure 4b ). As in previous cases, the negative correlation is not sufficient to cause the counterproductive effect. It also requires relatively inelastic demand. 
Substituting (42) into (43) gives (41). (42) and (43) together
Expession (40) suggests that the total environmental benefit achieved under unrestricted cost targeting depends on the budget, the benefit intensity of the retired resources, and the demand elasticity. The per-unit cost of the retired resources increases as demand gets more inelastic, reducing the amount of resources that can be purchased with a given budget. are below this line. Thus, the benefit intensity of the activated resources in U a ac 3 is lower than the benefit intensity of the retired resources in I a rt 3 . In summary, the results of this section suggest that slippage reduces the effectiveness of conservation funds and, sometimes, may lead to counterproductive environmental outcomes. In the next section, we show that because of slippage, cost-benefit targeting is no longer maximizing total environmental benefit for a given budget.
Benefit-maximizing Targeting Strategies
When output demand is perfectly elastic, cost-benefit targeting maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget. This result does not hold for inelastic output demand, however.
/ Wu, Zilberman, and Babcock
Proposition 4: If output demand is not perfectly elastic, then total environmental benefits will be maximized for a given budget if resources are ranked and purchased from high to low according to
where r > 0 if h < ¥ and r = 0 if h = ¥ . This benefit-maximizing targeting criterion puts a larger weight on output than benefit-cost targeting:
Proof: See the Appendix. Proposition 4 shows that only when output demand is perfectly elastic ( i.e, h = ¥ and r = 0 ), does benefit-cost targeting maximize total environmental benefit.
When demand is not perfectly elastic, the price feedback must be considered in designing targeting criteria to maximize total environmental benefits. Specifically, output price must be adjusted by (1+ ρ ) when the benefit-cost ratio is calculated. This adjustment will effectively put a larger weight on output and a relatively smaller weight on environmental benefits than benefit-cost targeting when deciding which resources to purchase. This adjustment aims to reduce the price feedback effect associated with inelastic demand, and is done by reducing purchase of output below the level under benefit-cost targeting. Specifically, total output will be reduced by a smaller amount if more high-benefit and high-output resources are purchased. For example, suppose there are two types of resources. Each unit of type-1 resource produces two units of output and three units of environmental benefits, and each unit type-2 resources produces one unit of output and one unit of environmental benefits. Suppose output price is one dollar and the production cost per unit of resource is 50 cents. Then profit per unit of resource would be $1.5
for type-1 resources and $0.5 for type-two resources. The benefit-cost ratio is 2 for both types of resource. If the output price is fixed, it does not matter which type of resource you purchase because you will receive the same amount of environmental benefit. However, if the output demand is highly inelastic, one would prefer to purchase the high-output high-benefit resource because the total output would be reduced by a small amount and, as a result, the slippage would be smaller. For example, a budget of $15 would allow you to purchase 10 units of type-1 resources, which would reduce output by 20 units, or 30 units of type-2 resources, which would
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reduce the total output by 30 units. This example illustrates that slippage would make the highbenefit high-output units relatively more attractive.
The effect of inelastic demand on targeting is illustrated in Figure 5 . Under benefit maximization, resources are ranked and purchased according to
, and resources in areas
A and E are purchased. Under benefit-cost targeting, resources are ranked and purchased according to b p y c ( ) 3 − , and resources in areas H, E, and D are purchased. By purchasing resources in area H instead of resources in area A, benefit-cost targeting causes a greater price increase. As a result, it has to purchase resources in area D, which would otherwise enter into production. It also has to pay a higher price for resources in area E. In addition, it causes more slippage than benefit-maximizing targeting by area C. This suggests that benefit-cost targeting spend too much money on low-output and low-benefit resources and too little money on high-output and high benefit resources.
The purchasing fund agency is in essence acting like a monoposonist. It realizes that it can affect the price of resources it purchases and, therefore, will modify its purchasing strategy to reduce the opportunity cost of benefit release. By purchasing more high-benefit and high-output resources than benefit-cost targeting, the agency can reduce the output price increase, which will reduces the purchasing cost and slippage.
As output demand becomes increasingly inelastic, more and more high-benefit and highoutput resources will be purchased in order to reduce the slippage. Graphically, the line + -= r l becomes flatter and benefit-maximizing targeting becomes more like benefit targeting. However, it will not become equivalent to benefit targeting as the demand elasticityh c approaches zero because r approaches a positive number which is less than infinite (see the definition of r in the Appendix). On the other hand, as output demand becomes increasingly elastic, more and more low-benefit and low-output resources will be targeted for conservation under benefit-maximizing targeting. Slippage will disappear and benefit-maximizing targeting becomes identical to benefit-cost targeting as the demand elasticity approaches infinity and r approaches zero.
The relative efficiency of benefit-cost targeting and benefit-maximizing targeting is illustrated in figure 6 . Previous studies ([4, pp. 36-55; 11] ) suggest that benefit-cost targeting maximizes total environmental benefit for a given level of market surplus (i.e., the sum of consumer, producer and government surpluses). However, a fund manager is often subject to a budget constraint instead of a market-surplus constraint. By switching from benefit-cost targeting to benefit-maximizing targeting, the fund manager would be able to achieve a higher level of environmental benefit, but with the loss of market surplus as a cost. Graphically, the manager moves from a to b in Figure 6a or from a' to b' in Figure 6b , trading market surplus for environmental benefits. The value of the additional environmental benefits is smaller than the loss of market surplus, resulting in a net social loss (point b is located inside the frontier curve). The fund manager cannot move along the frontier curve because of the budget constraint. To achieve the level of environmental benefit B B M by using benefit-cost targeting, the fund manager would need a larger budget ( ¢ G ). By using benefit-maximizing targeting, the manager can "stretch" the purchasing power of the budget by reducing the increase in the output price through purchasing some high-benefit and high-output resources.
Comparing Targeting Strategies: Inelastic Output Demand
This section compares the economic, environmental, and distributional effects of the four targeting strategies for the case of downward sloping output demand. The analysis focuses on only unrestricted targeting criteria because they are less likely to cause counterproductive environmental outcomes.
Proposition 5: If the distribution function is continuous in y and b and targeting is unrestricted, then < when demand is highly inelastic (small j ). Then there must be a more elastic demand curve (with higher j ) such that and. implies 
3 . (45) Equation (44) and equation (45) 
The budget constraint implies that 
Because , equations (46) and (47) ³ from proposition 4 establish the relationships in (i) and (ii).
To prove results in (iii), note that by definition,
Differentiate with respect to ,
. 
Producer surplus equals the sum of production profit and payments from the conservation fund:
Differentiating with respect to gives
Because p p p p
Higher output prices increase profit of utilized resources (intensive-margin effect) and profitable resource base (extensive-margin effect). Resource owners will benefit from a higher price whether they use the resources in production or sell them to the conservation fund. Now, we prove . implies that
Graphically, U C I 1 = + and U D I 3 = + in figure 7a . Since E y U E y U ( figure 7b because
This suggests that less money is spent on resources in C under benefit targeting than on resources in E under benefit-cost targeting, which cannot be because benefit-cost targeting must purchase resources in F and pay a higher price for resources in D, while benefit targeting spends all money on resources in D and C. Thus, the relationship 23 ()() QUQU ≥ must always hold.
Similarly, we can prove that Q U Q U ( ) ( ) 2 4 ³ .
To prove Q U Q U ( )
³ , we need to prove Q H Q C A ( ) ( ) ³ + in figure 5 because
This suggests that less money is spent on resources in A under benefit maximization than on resources in H under benefit-cost targeting, which cannot be true because benefit-cost targeting must purchase resources in D and pay a higher price for resources in E. Thus, the relation-
³ must hold. This result together with Q U Q U ( ) ( ) 2 4 ³ and 
The fund purchases resources in area (D+E+F) under cost targeting and resources in area (C+E) under benefit-cost targeting. Because the price is higher under cost targeting, more money is spent on resources in area C than in area D. Also, because the benefit-cost ratio of resources in C is higher than the benefit-cost ratio of resources in D, more benefits would be purchased in C than in D. Thus, B B
Proposition 5 suggests that benefit targeting results in the largest amount of resource used in production and the smallest amount of resource in conservation. As a result, the output is highest and the output price is lowest under benefit targeting. Consumers who do not care the environment should prefer benefit targeting to the other strategies because consumer surplus is highest under this targeting strategy. Other groups that may support benefit targeting are labor and input suppliers because this strategy has the smallest impact on production. Benefit targeting should be the least preferred strategy of the resource owners because it results in the lowest producer surplus.
With cost targeting, more resources are diverted from production than the other strategies, resulting in the largest reduction in output and the largest price increase. Cost targeting also results in the largest increase in producer surplus because resource owners receive the highest prices and have the lowest production cost (the number of resources utilized under this strategy is smallest). Essentially, cost targeting is most preferred by resource owners because it is most effective in reducing supply and enables them to take advantage of market power. Indeed, the Conservation Reserve Program that aims to provide environmental benefit and farm income supports used cost targeting before 1992.
When the output price is fixed, benefit-cost targeting maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget. It is also efficient because it maximizes total environmental benefit for a given level of market surplus. However, when the output demand is not perfectly elastic, benefit-cost targeting no longer maximizes total environmental benefit for a given budget. To maximize total environmental benefits, the price feedback must be considered in designing targeting criteria.
Specifically, output must be given a larger weight than in the case of benefit-cost targeting when deciding which resources to purchase. Without this adjustment, benefit-cost targeting may even provide few environmental benefits than benefit targeting. Indeed, when the output demand is not perfectly elastic, benefit-cost targeting should not be the most preferred strategy of any group.
Conclusions
New efforts aimed at increasing environment quality have led to establishment of funds to purchase environmental goods and to conserve natural resources. These funds use various purchasing strategies, the choice of which may lead to striking differences in environmental performance. This paper develops an analytical framework that recognizes spatial heterogeneity of resources in providing output and environmental benefits. We show that the performance of a purchasing strategy depends on the variability of and correlation between productivity and environmental benefits of resources.
We demonstrate that ignoring the output price effect of purchasing funds may have severe consequences. A purchasing fund should foresee the possible activation of previously idle resources as a result of output price increase, and purchase some of these idle resources. Limiting purchasing only to resources currently in production, as the CRP has been implemented, may reduce environmental gain from the purchasing fund and, in some cases, may make a purchasing fund counterproductive.
A purchasing strategy that targets resources with the highest environmental benefits may be counterproductive even if the possibility of slippage is recognized. This strategy, however, will
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have the smallest impact on output price and overall resource use among all strategies considered and should be favored by consumers and input providers. A strategy that targets low-cost resources will result in the largest reduction in production and the largest output price increase, and should be favored by resource owners. A strategy that targets resources with the highest benefitto-cost ratio is efficient and provides more environmental benefits than cost or benefit targeting when the output price is fixed. However, when the output demand is inelastic, benefit-cost y b y b g r a b ( ) ) ( , ) Suppose p p 4 3 > , then ( ) 1 4 3 + > r p p . In this case, we have either figure 8a or figure 8b . However, both figures are false. Figure 8b is false because it implies that benefit-maximizing targeting produces less total benefit than benefit-cost targeting. Under benefit-cost targeting, resources in D are used in production, while under benefit maximization, resources in D+A+C are used in production. To show that p p 4 3 > cannot hold in figure 8a, note that under the cost-benefit targeting, resources in area (E+C) are purchased, while under the benefit maximization, resources in area (A+C+D) are purchased. Because resources in C cost more under the benefit maximization, less money must be spent on resources in A than in E. Also, because the average benefitcost ratio is higher in E than in A, i.e., 
The resources in A must provide few benefits than resources in E, which contradicts the result that benefit-maximizing targeting maximizes total environmental benefit. Thus, p 4 cannot be greater than p 3 .
To prove that p p
, we need to show that figure 8c and figure 8d cannot hold.
Clearly, figure figure 8d cannot hold because it implies that total output is lower under the benefit maximization than under the benefit targeting, which contradicts the result that p p 4 3 £ . To show that figure 8c is also false, note that under the benefit maximization, resources in area (H+C) are purchased, while under benefit-cost targeting, resources in area (A+C+D+F) are purchased.
Because p p 4 3 £ , less money must be spent in area A than in area H, i.e., 
